The paper develops a model with lumpy setup costs of new investment, which govern the flows of FDI. Foreign investment decisions are two-fold: whether to export FDI and, if so, how much. The first decision is governed by total profitability considerations, whereas the second is governed by marginal profitability considerations. A positive productivity shock in the host country may, on the one hand, increases the volume of the desired FDI flows to the host country but, on the other hand, somewhat counter-intuitively, lowers the likelihood of the making new FDI flows by the source country, at all. Every country is potentially both a source for FDI flows to several host countries, and a host for FDI flows from several source countries. Thus, the model could generate two-way FDI flows, but not all source-host FDI flows get realized. We employ a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the period [1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998]. We observe many pairs of countries with no FDI flows between them.
Introduction
The paper develops an international capital ‡ows'model, with lumpy set up costs of new investment which govern the ‡ow of FDI. 1 The model works like this. First, a potential FDI investor decides how much she would like to invest. This decision is governed by marginal pro…tability considerations so as to equate marginal factor productivity to factor prices (that is, the standard …rst-order conditions). In the econometric terminology, this decision is described by a ‡ow (gravity) equation. Second, because of …xed costs of new investments, the potential FDI investor must also decide wether to carry out at all new 1 The international trade literature appeals often to …xed costs. These costs play a very important role in determining the extent of trade-based foreign direct investment through the reallocation of capital across industries and the emergence of comparative advantages; see Zhang and Markusen (1999) investments. This decision is governed by the total (rather than the marginal) pro…tability of the new investment. In the econometric terminology, the decision is described by a so-called participation equation. In the model, every country is potentially both a source for FDI ‡ows to several host countries, and a host for FDI ‡ows from several source countries. But because of …xed costs, some of the source-host country pairs are inactive.
In the presence of …xed costs, a productivity shock in the host country may also, on the one hand, increases the volume of the desired FDI ‡ows to this country; as expected; but, on the other hand, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the shock lowers the likelihood of making new FDI ‡ows at all, by the source country.
Our sample consists of 24 OECD countries over the period 1981-1998. 2 When one looks at data on international capital ‡ows of FDI, one is immediately struck by the lack of ‡ows from some source countries to many host countries. Only 17 countries are a source for FDI out ‡ows, and each one of them exports FDI to only a few host countries. Thus there is a prima facia evidence for the existence of …xed setup costs of investment that shut o¤ the potential of "small"capital ‡ows, even though they may have been called for by marginal productivity conditions.
Previous empirical literature on the determinants of FDI ‡ows frequently make use of the Tobit procedure. But this procedure, which is proper to handle measurement errors, reduces in essence, the ‡ow and participation equations into just one equation. In contrast, by employing Heckman (1979) selection procedure, the two equations that are jointly estimated yield estimates that provide insight about the two equations separately.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the two equations cannot be combined, as in theory, exogenous shocks have con ‡icting e¤ects on the likelihood of FDI ‡ows and their magnitudes. Put it econometrically, the errors terms in the two equations are negatively correlated, and this implies that the Tobit procedure yields biased estimates. Controlling for the selection into source-host pairs of countries, and for time and country …xed 2 In Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2003) we employ a sample of 45 countries, both developed and developing countries. But the OECD data set is inacurate about the exports of FDI to non-OECD countries.
e¤ects, the paper sheds light on the importance of several covariates, such as income per capita, education, and …nancial risk ratings as key determinants of volume of FDI ‡ows.
While the coe¢ cients of both the source-and host-country average years of schooling are positive and signi…cant in the ‡ow equation, the magnitude of the source country coe¢ -cient is more than twice that of the host country. That is, the richer the source country is relative to the host country, the larger are the FDI ‡ows which occur between them.
Our …ndings therefore suggest that capital does ‡ow from a high income country to a low income country, and from countries with high average years of schooling to countries with low average years of schooling, in the way suggested when one looks at marginal productivity conditions alone.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model of …xed setup costs of foreign direct investment. Section 3 presents the econometric approach.
The data are described in Section 4. Estimation results of the determinants of FDI ‡ows, and whether source-host ‡ows are formed at all, are presented in Section 5. The results are interpreted in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Marginal Pro…tability Versus Total Pro…tability
We employ a "lumpy" adjustment cost for new investment, in the form of a …xed setup cost of investment. 3 This speci…cation, which has been recently supported empirically by Caballero and Engel (1999, 2000) , creates a situation in which FDI decisions become two-fold decisions: whether to export FDI at all, and, if so, how much. These decisions are pair-wise: that is, they are made by each source country with respect to each host country, as the "lumpy" adjustment cost is speci…c for each source-host pair. In our setup of exogenous shocks can a¤ect these two decisions in opposite directions. That 3 Evidently, this speci…cation gives rise to economies of scale. Such economies either in the production or investment technologies are also a key contributor to the gains from trade and economic integration.
For example, based on estimates taken from a partial equilibrium analysis, the Cecchini (1988) Report assessed that the gains from taking advantage of economies of scale will constitute about 30 percent of the total gains from the European market integration in 1992.
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is, a shock can lower the likelihood of exporting FDI from a certain source country to a certain host country; but, if such an export is carried out, its magnitude is even higher.
Consider a representative industry in a given host country (H), in a world of free capital mobility which …xes the world rate of interest, denoted by r. There is a single good which serves both for consumption and investment. For simplicity, suppose that …rms in this industry, all identical, last for two periods. The initial stock of capital is denoted by K 0 H . If the …rm invests I in the …rst period, it augments its capital stock to K 0 H + I and its gross output in the second period will be A H F (K; L), where F ( ) is a concave production function, L is the labor input, and A H is a productivity factor.
We assume that there exists a …xed setup cost of investment. For simplicity, assume that this …xed cost is generated by a …xed input (L C H ) of domestic labor. Thus, the …xed cost is equal to W H L C H , where W H is the wage rate in the host country. In order for the …rm to be able to incur such a setup cost, we assume that, due to some (suppressed) …xed factor, F ( ) exhibits diminishing returns to scale in K and L, that is F is strictly concave. Thus, the implied average cost curve is U-shaped, which is consistent with perfect competition that we assume.
Consider a representative …rm which does invest in the …rst period an amount I = K K 0 H in order to augment its stock of capital to K. Its present value becomes
(For simplicity, it is assumed that capital does not depreciate).
The demand of such a …rm for K and L are denoted by
, respectively, they are de…ned by the marginal productivity conditions
and
Note, however, that the …rm may choose not to invest at all (that is, to stick to its existing stock of capital K 0 H ) and avoid the lumpy setup cost
In this case its present value is:
The …rm will make a new investment if, and only if,
That is, the …rm makes the amount of investment that is called for by the marginal productivity conditions (2) and (3) 
This market clearance equation determines the wage rate in the host country as a function W H (A H ) of the productivity factor (and other exogenous factors, such as L 0 H , which are kept constant and are therefore suppressed).
Note that no similar market clearance condition is speci…ed for capital, as we assume that capital is f reely mobile internationally and its return is …xed at r.
We now turn to discuss FDI ‡ows from the source country S to the host country H. We treat as FDI the investment of source-country entrepreneurs in the acquisition of host country …rms. Suppose that the source country entrepreneurs are endowed with some "intangible" capital, or know-how, stemming from their specialization or expertise in the industry at hand. We model this comparative advantage by assuming that the lumpy setup cost of investment in the host country, when investment is done by the source country entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is only L C H which is below L C H , the lumpy setup cost 6 of investment when carried out by the host country direct investors. This means that the foreign direct investors can bid up the direct investors of the host country in the purchase of the investing …rms in the host country. The representative …rm is purchased at its value
. This essentially assumes that competition among the foreign direct investors pushes the price of the acquired …rm to its maximized value. Thus, the FDI investors shift all the gains from their lower setup cost to the host-country original owners of the …rm. The new owners also invest an amount
H ] to expand the capital stock of the acquired the …rm. On the other hand, if condition (6) does not hold then there will be no FDI ‡ows from S to H. Thus, aggregate foreign direct investment is equal to:
The model thus suggests that if the productivity factor (A H ) is su¢ ciently high, and/or the wage rate (w H ) is su¢ ciently low, and/or the setup cost (w H L C H ) is su¢ ciently low, then FDI ‡ows from country S to country H are positive. Otherwise, the ‡ow of FDI from S to H is zero.
Recall the model's special feature is the two-fold mechanism of FDI decisions. First, one decides how much to invest abroad while ignoring the …xed setup cost. Second a decision is made whether to invest at all, while taking into account this cost. The hallmark of our empirical approach is based on the two equations (conditions) that govern these decisions. First, ignoring the setup cost, the FDI ‡ows from Country S to country H (denoted by F DI N O ) is governed by a " ‡ow"equation:
That is, the quantity of investment (K + ) and the acquisition price (V + ) are governed by the marginal productivity conditions (2) and (3). Second, the question whether FDI ‡ows from S to H are at all positive, is governed by a "participation"equation (condition):
Consider now the e¤ect of an increase in the host country's productivity factor A H .
Suppose initially that the wage rate in the host country (w H ) is …xed [that is, ignore the labor market clearance condition in equation (7)]. An increase in A H raises the quantity 
The Econometric Approach
The preceding section presents a model of bilateral foreign direct investment ‡ows distinguished by lumpy setup costs of investment. 5 Our empirical investigation is in the tradition of the often used gravity models, 6 but with adjustments for a selection bias of all potential country pairs into source and host countries. With n countries in the sample, there are potentially n(n 1) pairs of source-host (s h) countries. In fact, as we show in the data section below, the actual number of s h pairs is smaller. Therefore, the selection into s h pairs, which is naturally endogenous, cannot be ignored; that is, this selection cannot be taken as exogenous, which has been a standard practice in most gravity models.
Denote by Y i;j;t the ‡ow of FDI from source country i to host country j in period t:
The corresponding FDI ‡ows from source country j to host country i are denoted by Y j;i;t :
Note that with this notation, Y i;j;t almost always non-negative. 7 But, it may well be zero, because typically, in a global economy, there are only a few countries which signi…cantly export FDI to all, or most countries.
The existence of a setup cost of investment makes investment "lumpy". This means that the conventional determinants of FDI ‡ows (such as standard marginal productivity conditions) have to generate a su¢ ciently large infra-marginal pro…ts, so as to surpass a certain unobserved threshold. Otherwise, the observed FDI ‡ows are practically zero. We argue that the sub-sample of FDI source countries is not a random sample of the countries in the global economy, if setup costs play a signi…cant role in the determination of FDI ‡ows. We now develop a simple econometric approach to study the e¤ect of setup costs and correct for selection bias in the analysis of FDI ‡ows. 8 
The Participation Equation
To estimate the gravity FDI ‡ow model, and to identify the role of setup costs, the statistical model takes full advantage of the well-known Heckman's selection model [see Heckman (1979) and Kyriazidou (1996) ].
To simplify, but without losing generality, let us assume that, in an imaginary world with no setup costs, potential FDI ‡ows (Y i;j;t ) exhibit the following linear form:
where X F;i;j;t stands for a vector of observed variables that potentially explain the pattern of FDI ‡ows (hence the F subscript). This equation is the analogue of equation (9) in
We correct for liquidation in Table 4 . into account the incidental truncation of the data, since the average maturity is available only for countries which issue bonds to the world market. The missing observations cannot be treated as zero maturity.
They show, as expected, that countries with weak macroeconomic stance are less likely to issue bonds.
In this case the problem reduces to be the standard Tobin model. Smarzyska and Wei applied Heckman method to study the e¤ects of corruption on FDI in transition economies.
the preceding section. Such variables are, for example, per-capita income di¤erentials between country i and country j (re ‡ecting di¤erences in the capital-labor ratio), as well as, language, geographical distance, legal system, and communication or transportation costs. The vector represents the ceteris paribus e¤ect of X i;j;t on Y j;i;t :
The error term U F;i;j;t is a composite of (i) an unobserved time invariant heterogeneity ( i;j ) ; which re ‡ects, persistent gaps between, for instance, the wage in the i source and the j host countries (" i;j ) ; and (ii) a random shock term, which is i j pairwise-speci…c i;j;t , re ‡ecting both deviations from the "long-run"wage gap ( " i;j;t ) ; as well as other ‡uctuations in macroeconomic policy, political events, etc., that are unique to the i j source-host pair.
Let Z i;j;t be a latent variable, which represents pro…ts from the direct investment made in host country j, by the …rms in the source country i; in period t. To simplify, we assume that pro…ts are a linear function of the ‡ow of FDI, which takes the form Z i;j;t Y i;j;t C i;j;t , where C i;j;t is the setup cost. De…ne Z i;j;t =Z i;j;t = Z , where Z is the standard deviation ofZ. We further assume that Z i;j;t exhibits the following linear form:
where X 2;i;j;t and are a regressor row vector and a coe¢ cient vector, which a¤ect the normalized pro…ts, respectively, and V i;j;t is the error term respectively. Note that the variables in the vector for X 1 are all included in the vector X 2 . But vector X 2 includes also …xed-cost variables. In a random sample, we assume that the classical assumptions, regarding the error term, hold. We further assume that the error terms are normally distributed:
We also assume that the error terms U i;j;t and V i;j;t follow a bivariate normal distribution:
(U i;j;t ; V i;j;t ) N (0; ); with variances 2 U and 2 v , respectively.
where is the correlation coe¢ cient between the cross-equation error terms.
Setup Costs and Selection Bias
The (statistical) population-regression function for equation (11) is:
E (Y i;j;t j X F;i;j;t ) = X F;i;j;t :
Many previous studies aimed at estimating the e¤ects of X on Y , in the context of international capital mobility, typically ignore the e¤ect of the unobserved setup costs on the (observed) capital ‡ows. According to our model, FDI ‡ows (Y i;j;t ) are positive, if and only if Z i;j;t 0. Thus, we de…ne a binary variable D i;j;t , by
1 if Z i;j;t = X 2;i;j;t + V i;j;t 0 0 otherwise
Note that whereas Z i;j;t is not observed, the binary variable D i;j;t is indeed observed.
Assuming that the errors in the underlying latent equation are distributed normally then the probability setup for the probit equation exhibits the following form.
Pr(D i;j;t = 1 j ) = Pr(X 2;i;j;t V i;j;t ) = (X 2;i;j;t ): (17) where is the cdf of the unit normal distribution.
Therefore, the regression function for the sub-sample of countries for which we do indeed observe positive FDI ‡ows is:
E(Y i;j;t j X i;j;t ; D i;j;t = 1) = X i;j;t + E(U i;j;t j X i;j;t ; D i;j;t = 1)
Note that the last term, the conditional expectation of U i;j;t does no longer equal to zero.
Furthermore, it depends on X i;j;t , thus upsetting the classical assumptions concerning regression functions when applied to random samples.
To see this, one can substitute equations (12) and (16) into equation (17) to get:
E(Y i;j;t jX i;j;t ; D i;j;t = 1) = X i;j;t + E(U i;j;t j V i;j;t X i;j;t ):
Because U i;j;t and V i;j;t follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation and with variances 2 U and 2 V , respectively, it follows that the expected volume of FDI ‡ows from the source country i into the host country j in equation (18) is equal to:
where the inverse Mill's ratio, i;j;t , is de…ned by:
and where and are the unit normal density and the cumulative distribution functions, respectively. The bias (in the population ) term is equal to the partial derivative of the conditional expectations of U with respect to X: That is:
where i;j;t is a positive number.
9 Figure 1 provides the intuition for the case where > 0. Suppose, for instance, that X i;j;t measures the per-capita income di¤erential between the ith source country and the jth potential host country, holding all other variables constant, namely per-capita income di¤erentials between the ith source country and all the rest of the countries. Our theory predicts that parameter is positive in this case. This is shown by the upward sloping line AB. Note that this slope is an estimate of the "true" underlying e¤ect of X i;j;t on Y i;j;t . But, recall that ‡ows could be equal to zero if the set up cost are su¢ ciently high.
The capital- ‡ow threshold derived from the setup costs is shown as line TT ' in Figure 1. 9 Let = X i;j;t : Then the partial derivative of the inverse Mills ratio is:
so that i;j;t > 0:
However, recall that the data include only those country pairs for which Y i;j;t is positive.
This sub-sample is, therefore, no longer random . Moreover, as equation (12) makes clear the selection of country pairs into this sub-sample depends on the vector X i;j;t :
To see this, suppose, for instance, that for high values of X i;j;t (the speci…c level X H in Figure 1 ) i-j pair-wise FDI ‡ows are all positive. That is, for all pairs of countries potential Y i;j;t are higher than the threshold line. Thus, the observed average, for X i;j;t = X H is also equal to the conditional population average, point R on the line AB. However, this does not hold for low values of X i;j;t (denoted by X L ). For those i-j pairs we observe positive values of Y i;j;t only in a non-random sample of the population. For instance, point S is excluded from the observed sub-sample of positive FDI ‡ows. consequently, as predicted by our model, we observe only those with low setup cost (namely high V i;j;t ), among those with low X i;j;t :As seen in Figure 1 , the observed conditional average is at point M 0 ; which lies above point M: The sub-sample OLS regression line is shown by the line A 0 B 0 , which understates the in ‡uence of the income per capita di¤erentials on the ‡ows of FDI.
Selection Bias: Setup Costs Versus Measurement Errors
There is a long tradition in the international economics literature of log-linearizing the capital ‡ow gravity model, and estimating the parameters of interest by ordinary least squares (OLS). In these statistical models the gravitational force can be very small, but not zero, whereas FDI ‡ows for a i j source-host pair of countries is often zero. The empirical literature developed after Tinbergen (1962) has often either ignored pairs with no FDI ‡ows, or treated these cases as measurement errors, or as literally indicating zero ‡ows. 10 This view is consistent with models that ignore the role of setup costs. In such models pairs with zero ‡ows do indeed represent zero ‡ows; or they re ‡ect measurement errors (which are common with a small volume of capital ‡ows). In our theoretical model, setup costs play an important role in determining whether a source country i invest directly in a host country j. Moreover, the model predicts that there well could be a negative correlation between the error term in the FDI ‡ows equation and the error term in the participation equation.
This prediction of the model distinguishes between the "setup cost model" and the "measurement errors hypothesis". While the the "measurement errors hypothesis" is consistent only with a positive , the "setup cost model" is consistent also with a negative .
Tobit and Setup Costs
The Tobit model [see Tobin (1958) Y i;j;t = X i;j;t + U i;j;t ;
Note that Y i;j;t could be negative (for instance, when the rate of return di¤erential works in favor of country i). The latent variable Y i;j;t is observed only if it is positive.
Thus, the actual dependent variable Y i;j;t is by the way the data is constructed,
The population regression function for equation (11) is: 
Comparing the set of equations (9) - (10) should not ignore the possibility that foreign direct investment ‡ows from source country i to host country j may a¤ect both economies. If such in ‡uence exists, the explanatory variables, such as GDP per capita in the source and the host countries, are expected to be correlated with the error terms in the ‡ow and in the participation equations. We address this endogeneity problem by instrumenting our explanatory variables using lagged values.
Because our theory does not generate any prior about the time structure of the X t time series, we estimate the full system using various time lags. We also use the rare cases of lagged negative ‡ows in the data as an instrument that proxies lagged values of the stock of FDI.
Data
Our data is drawn from OECD reports (OECD, various years) on a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the period from 1961 to 1998. The data on FDI ‡ows are for the period from 1981 to 1998 only. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports from 17 OECD source countries to 24 OECD countries. 12 We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of 3 years).
The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country characteristics such as GDP or GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment (as measured by average years of schooling), language, …nancial risk rating, etc.; (2) s h source-host pairs, such as s h FDI ‡ows, geographical distance, common language (zero-one variable), s h ‡ows of goods, bilateral telephone tra¢ c per-capita as a proxy for informational distance, etc.
Appendix B provides more information on the data: Table B1 describes the list of the 24 countries in the sample, and whether observed in the sample (at least once) as a source or host country (but most source countries do not interact more than with few host countries), and Table B2 describes the data sources. Table 1 and Table 2 provide a …rst look at the direction and volume of FDI ‡ows. While s-h di¤erences in GDP per capita look like good predictors of the direction of ‡ows (the exstensive margin; see Table 1 ), they are not correlated with the volume of FDI ‡ows for the subset of country paris with positive ‡ows (the intensive margin; see Table 2 ).
Estimation
We now turn to the estimation of the determinants of these ‡ows. To estimate the e¤ect of GDP per capita, education, and …nancial risk ratings, on FDI ‡ows, we now control for country and time …xed e¤ects. The dependent variable in all the ‡ow (gravity)
equations is the log of the FDI ‡ow, de ‡ated by the unit value of manufactured goods exports.
We estimate the model under three alternative econometric procedures. As a benchmark, we ignore the selection equation (17), and simply estimate the gravity equation (11) twice: (i) by treating all FDI ‡ows in s-h pairs with no recorded FDI ‡ows as "zeros";
(ii) excluding country pairs with no FDI ‡ows. 13 The rationale for inserting "zeros"is as follows. Generally, when one observes no FDI ‡ows between a pair of countries, it could be either because the two countries do not wish to have such ‡ows, even in the absence of …xed costs, or because setup costs are prohibitive for low ‡ows, or because of measurement errors. But in this benchmark case, which ignores setup costs and measurement errors, s-h pairs with no FDI ‡ows "truly" indicate zero ‡ows. This is why we assume a neglegible value as a common low value for the value of the FDI ‡ows for the no- ‡ows s-h pairs. 14 (All other positive ‡ows have logarithmic value much exceeding zero.) The estimation results for this benchmark case are shown in panel A of Table 3 .
As a second benchmark, we treat all FDI ‡ows that are below a certain low threshold level (censor) as due to measurement errors, and employ a Tobit estimator. (Note that this estimator is appropriate also in the case where the desired FDI ‡ows were actually negative, as in the case where a foreign subsidiary is liquidated, but were reported as zeros.) We report the results in Panel B in Table 3 , with three censor levels (lowest, 0.0 and 3.00).
Against these two benchmarks, the complete picture, and especially the role played by the unobserved …xed set up costs, are brought to the limelight, when we employ the third econometric procedure. This procedure, the Heckman selection method, jointly estimates the maximum likelihood of the ‡ow (gravity) equation and the selection equation. This estimation accommodates both measurement errors and a possible existence of set up costs. 15 Consider a binary variable D i;j;t which is equal to 1 if country i exports positive FDI ‡ows to country j at time t: Assuming that setup cost are lower if country i already 13 More precisely, the log of the FDI ‡ow is set equal to log of the lowest observed ‡ow between any s-h country pair in the sample. 14 We choose this value to be the lowest observe ‡ow between any s-h country pair in the sample 15 We have a few cases of negative ‡ows in our sample. We control for that using a dummy variable in the selection equation. See Appendix.
invested in the past in country j, then D i;j;t k could serve as an instrument in the selection equation (exclusion restriction). The results are reported in Panel C in Table 3 .
Both OLS and Tobit estimations conform to the notion that the volume of FDI ‡ows is not a¤ected by deviation from long-run averages in the source and host countries.
GDP per capita is also not signi…cant in Heckman selection equation. 16 Turning to the e¤ect of the host country education level, relative to the source country counterpart:
while educational gaps have no e¤ect on the intensive margin, they do have a signi…cant e¤ect on the extensive margin. To test whether the e¤ect is non-linear we estimate the paramters of interest, we provide OLS and Tobit estimates for di¤erent ranges of FDI ‡ows. 17 The …rst two columns report the OLS coe¢ cients for all country-pairs and for the sub-sample of country-pairs with positive FDI ‡ows respectively. While the coe¢ cient of the educational gaps is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the …rst column the point estimate is substantial smaller and insigni…cant when we estimate the e¤ect of educational attainements gaps within the sub-sample of country-pairs with positive FDI ‡ows (intensive margin). This suggests that di¤erences between source and host country schooling levels are very important in explaining the di¤erences between country-pairs with no FDI ‡ows (imputed ‡ows) and country-pairs with "true" positive ‡ows rather than the variation among country-pairs with positive FDI ‡ows.
The e¤ect of education on the extensive margin is also well re ‡ected in our estimates using the Tobit and Heckman models. We …nd signi…cant e¤ects in the Tobit and Heckman models. However, while the Tobit model predicts that FDI ‡ows are positively related to host-source di¤erence in education levels, the Heckman model predicts that the education level a¤ect positively the likelihood of a non-zero source-host pair, but does not in ‡uence the volume of FDI ‡ows within the pair. Note that by imposing the no …xed cost assumption (as in the Tobit model) we might mistakenly conclude that educational gaps a¤ect FDI volumes while in fact they a¤ect only the extensive margin. 16 Recall that in the estimation we control for country …xed e¤ects. In Appendix C Table C .1 we present also results of the estimation without controling for country …xed e¤ects. 17 We are indebted to Anil Kashyap for suggesting us to compare the coe¢ cients over di¤erent volumes of FDI ‡ows.
Source-country …nancial risk ratings is important in all models; but we …nd evidence for the importance of the ratings only in Heckman's selection equation. Improvements in the source-country …nancial risk rating lead to a fall in the volume of FDI ‡ows as expected. 18 In contrast to the OLS and Tobit models, where the e¤ects of risk ratings is only on the volume of FDI ‡ows, in the Heckman model the e¤ect is only on the likelihood of a country becoming a source for FDI exports. The di¤erence between the OLS and Tobit models, on the one hand, and the Heckman model, on the other hand, is sharp when we look at the e¤ect of host country …nancial risk ratings. We …nd no e¤ect whatsoever in the OLS and Tobit models. In contrast, the Heckman model shows that an improvement in the host-country …nancial risk ratings raises the volume of FDI ‡ows.
As expected, and consistent with previous gravity equation literature, we …nd that common language raises, and distance reduces the volume of FDI ‡ows. Deviations of population size from long run averages have no e¤ect in the OLS and Tobit models. This is not surprising when we look at the Heckman estimations: host-country population size a¤ects FDI ‡ows negatively, but the selection equation coe¢ cient is positive. The source country population size e¤ect is insigni…cant in all models.
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The coe¢ cient of the lagged FDI participation variable (D i;j;t 2 ) in panel C is expressed in terms of standard deviations of the unobserved pro…ts. Thus, a pairs of countries which already had positive FDI ‡ows between them in period t 2 (six years before), have the equivalent saving in setup cost of investment in period t; of a 0:7 standard deviation of pro…ts. Most importantly as a "smoking gun" for the existence of …xed costs in the data, we note that: The correlation between the error terms in the ‡ow and the selection equations is negative and signi…cant. This …nding, on which we further elaborate in the next section , provides an additional evidence for the relevance of …xed set up costs.
In Table 4 we use past FDI liquidations as instruments. They are good instruments 18 Note, from Tables C.1 in Appendix C, that without controling for country …xed e¤ects the coe¢ cient of source country …nancial risk rating is implausibly positive. Without country …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient may re ‡ect unobserved, time-invariant, country characteristics, rather than the e¤ect of risk ratings on FDI ‡ows. 19 Note from Tables C.1 in Appendix C, that without country …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient is signi…cant.
because they are correlated positively with past FDI ‡ows (Liquidations, by de…nition, are generated from existing stocks) but not apriori correlated with current FDI ‡ows.
Interpretation
The …nding that there is a signi…cant correlation ( ) between the error terms in the gravity and participation equations indicates that the formation of an s h pair of countries and the size of the FDI ‡ow between this pair of countries are not independent processes. 
Conclusion
The existence of setup costs of foreign direct investment must present foreign investors with a two-fold decision: whether to establish subsidiaries in a speci…c host country at all, and how much to invest in the subsidiary, if they decide to establish it. Invoking this simple idea we estimate in this paper a participation equation (the decision whether to invest at all) jointly with a ‡ow equation (the decision how much to invest).
The FDI model works as follows. A comparative advantage for the source country is based on low setup costs of direct investment, relative to setup costs of domestic investors.
This allows foreign investors to bid up for investment projects in the host country. An exogenous productivity shock in the host country may a¤ect the decision of the FDI investors whether to invest at all, and how much to invest, in opposite directions. For instance, a positive productivity shock, ceteris paribus, improves both marginal and total pro…tability of new investment. But, it also raises the demand for labor and consequently wages. The rise in wages, in turn, mitigates the initial rise in the marginal pro…tability and in the total pro…tability of the new investment, through its adverse e¤ect on variable costs. However, the increase in wage costs does not completely o¤set the initial rise in the marginal and total productivity of new investments. As a result, the positive productivity shock implies a net rise in the marginal pro…tability of new investment. This may not be the case with total pro…tability. It is adversely a¤ected by the rise in wages not only through the increase in the variable costs, but also through the increase in the wage bill associated with setup costs. Hence, it may well be the case that a positive productivity shock increases the marginal productivity and lowers the total pro…tability of new investments, at the same time. Our model therefore provides a rationale for the negative correlation between the residuals of the participation and ‡ow equations, which our econometric study is able to detect. then we should expect a negative correlation between the error terms of the gravity and the participation equation.
We do indeed …nd that the correlation between the error terms is negative in our data set, indicating the importance of setup costs that governs the export of FDI in the data. We …nd that the important predictors of the likelihood of which pair of countries will be linked by host-source relationship selection are: (1) source country GDP per capita, (2) di¤erence in education levels (as measured by average years of schooling), and (3) di¤erences in …nancial risk ratings. These variables may also be interpreted as good proxies for setup costs because they are expected to determine the technological and …nancial ease by which a foreign subsidiary is established. Generally, these …ndings support an existence of setup costs of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the evidence points to di¤ering e¤ects on FDI ‡ows driven by the marginal productivity conditions and 23 the setup cost conditions, as rationalized in our theoretical model. The paper also sheds light on the importance of several covariates, such as income per capita, education, and …nancial risk ratings as key determinants of volume of FDI ‡ows. While the coe¢ cients of both the source-and host-country average years of schooling are positive and signi…cant in the ‡ow equation, the magnitude of the source country coe¢ cient is more than twice that of the host country. That is, the richer the source country is relative to the host country, the larger are the FDI ‡ows which occur between them. Our …ndings therefore suggest that capital does ‡ow from a high income country to a low income country, and from countries with high average years of schooling to countries with low average years of schooling, in the way suggested when one looks at marginal productivity conditions alone. The characteristics of the host-source country pair with respect to the setup costs are crucially important.
8 Appendix A: A Productivity Shock
For a …xed wage rate w H , it follows from equation (8), for the case of positive FDI ‡ows,
Using the envelope theorem, it follows from equation (1) that
Total di¤erentiation of equations (2) and (3) with respect to A H (while still maintaining w H constant) yields:
and @L
In equations (A3) and (A4) we assume that capital and labor are substitute to each other in the production function, namely that F KL > 0. (Recall also that F KK F LL F 2 KL > 0, F KK < 0, and F LL < 0, by the concavity of F .) Equations (A1) -(A3) imply that
Thus, for a given w H , an increase in A H raises FDI, and K + and V + .
However, when new investment is made, equation (A4) implies that a rise in A H
increases the demand for labor. When no new investment is made, it follows from equation (4), for a given w H , that
Thus, the demand for labor rises in this case as well.
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9 Appendix B: Data Description Note: in logŝ^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.^^ FDI flows from country i to country j being negative. 
